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Case No. 20150605-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for six counts of possession with 
intent to distribute, a first degree felony; three counts of possession with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony; one count of theft by receiving 
stolen property, a third degree felony; and one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant was convicted for receiving stolen property and 
committing various drug crimes including possession with intent to 
distribute myriad illicit drugs, but he challenges only the admissibility of 
evidence supporting his drug-related convictions. Defendant argues that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the trial court erred in overruling an alleged prejudice objection to evidence 
that he contacted the DEA and offered to help agents gain access to a high-
level heroin trafficker in exchange for leniency in this case. Alternatively, 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not raising a prejudice 
objection to the evidence. Defendant further argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to an amendment to the information that 
substituted a sports facility for a ballet school as the facility that triggered 
the drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. Defendant has not shown that his 
prejudice objection was preserved below; nor has he met his heavy burden 
to show deficient performance and prejudice with regard to either of his 
ineffectiveness clahns. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Defendant was arrested for trying to sell a stolen trailer. At the 
time of his arrest, he was in sole possession of a briefcase filled with myriad, 
distributable amounts of illicit drugs including heroin, paraphernalia, two 
valid prescription bottles containing Oxycodone bearing his name, and 
identification documents belonging to people not involved in the case. 
After he was charged, Defendant contacted the DEA and offered to 
help agents gain access to a high-level heroin dealer in exchange for 
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reduced charges. There is no evidence that Defendant ever discussed his 
request for leniency with the prosecuting attorney. 
(a). Did the trial court err in overruling an alleged objection under 
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to a DEA agent's testimony that 
Defendant offered to help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin 
trafficker in exchange for reduced charges? 
Standard of Review. This issue is unpreserved; no standard of review 
applies. 
(b). Alternatively, was trial counsel ineffective because he did not 
raise a rule 403 objection to evidence of Defendant's offer to help the DEA? 
Standard of Review. An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised 
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Bedell, 2014 
UT 1, ,120, 322 P.3d 697. 
2. The morning of trial, the prosecutor filed an amended information 
that substituted a sports facility for a ballet school previously identified as 
the facility that h·iggered the drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. The trial 
court allowed the amendment on the ground that the prosecutor would call 
an owner of the sports facility to testify, as per trial counsel's request. 
Counsel investigated the sports facility online and both the prosecutor and 
counsel interviewed the owner during a break before the owner testified. 
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Was h·ial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the amendment? 
Standard of Review. See l.(b)., above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
Following Defendant's arrest for trying to sell a stolen trailer, he was 
found in possession of myriad illicit pills and other drugs (including 
heroin), digital scales, packaging materials, paraphernalia, two valid 
prescription bottles containing Oxycodone bearing his name, and several 
identifications belonging to other people. See R444-R448; State's Exhibit (SE) 
13,13A,19,19A (SE7-29 are attached in Addendum B). 
* * * 
Defendant was arrested near where he was trying to sell a stolen 
trailer on Geneva Road, in Lindon, Utah. See R384. Defendant told one of 
two officers from the Lindon City Police Department, Officer Boren, that he 
was selling the trailer for someone who owed him money, but whose name 
1 Defendant does not contest his conviction for receiving stolen 
property; the State thus limits its summary of facts to those relevant to 
Defendant's drug convictions. 
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he did not know. R378,R381-382,R478.2 Defendant also denied knowing 
who owned the Cadillac he was driving at the time, claiming that he had 
borrowed it from a friend of a friend. R460-461. Boren was ultimately able 
to confirm that Defendant in fact had the owner's permission to drive the 
Cadillac. Id. Boren also obtained the bill of sale for the trailer from 
Defendant. R461;SE5. It listed two names, Joshua Haskill and Robin Smith. 
SES. Boren h 4 ied unsuccessfully to follow up on both names. R462,R478. 
Defendant told Boren that he did not know Haskill. R478. 
Officer Boren had already left for the jail with Defendant when, in the 
course of an inventory search, Detective Purvis found a briefcase in the 
trunk of the Cadillac. See R463. The briefcase contained myriad illicit pills 
and other drugs (including methamphetamine, heroin, and LSD), digital 
scales, paraphernalia (including spoons, pipes, syringes, wrapping papers), 
and packaging material. R383-387,R434-451;SE7-29. Although the illicit 
pills and other drugs in the briefcase were packaged in single-user amounts, 
in Purvis' s twenty-one years of experience, the totality of the briefcase's 
contents supported that the drugs were intended for distribution: "[I]t's all 
packaged together and massive amounts of different kinds of pills. That's 
2 Before trial, Boren killed himself and several family 1nembers in a 
murder-suicide. See R462. 
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common with people distributing medications to other people." R474; see 
also R386-R387 ("That's typical of what dealers use to sell their product. 
They package it in smaller packages, use scales to weigh out the large 
quantities to put in the smaller packages."); R455 (" [I]ts a large distributable 
amount of stuff."). 
The briefcase also contained two valid prescriptions for Oxycodone in 
Defendant's name, see R438,R443-444;SE13-13A&SE19-19A, a wallet 
belonging to Joshua Haskill, and several identifications belonging to other 
people, see R466-67. Both Officer Boren and Detective Purvis tried 
unsuccessfully to make contact with Haskill and the other people whose 
identifications were found in the briefcase. See R466-67,R471,R478-479. 
According to Purvis, most of the individuals were "into drugs" and their 
families no longer had contact with them or knew where to locate them. 
R467; see also R479 ("[T]heir families lost touch with them. They said they 
were on drugs, they didn't know what they were doing, they didn't have 
any way to contact them themselves."). Haskill, however, later contacted 
law enforcement about his missing driver's license. See R480-481. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with theft by receiving stolen property worth 
over $5000, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West 2004); 
-6-
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six counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in 
a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-S(l}(a)(iii), 
(4) (West Supp. 2015-2016); three counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a second degree 
felony, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-S(l)(a)(iii), (4) (West Supp. 2015-2016); and 
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37a-5(1) (West 2012) (R27-30). 
1. Defendant contacts the DEA and offers to help agents 
gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange 
for leniency. 
After he was charged, Defendant contacted a DEA agent, Brandon 
Holmer, via the "duty phone." R412-413, R418. The II duty phone" is an 
11 after hours," "publically available number" that anyone may use to report 
"drug trafficking activities." R412-413. Defendant told Agent Holmer that 
he would introduce him to a high-level-heroin trafficker in Salt Lake City in 
exchange for "consideration with his pending charges in Utah County." 
R419. 
2. The trial court overrules a relevance objection to evidence 
of Defendant's offer.3 
At trial, Defendant objected on relevance grounds to Agent Holmer 
testifying about his offer to help the DEA. R414. Outside the presence of 
3 Pertinent h·anscript pages (R414-432) are attached in Addendum C. 
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the jury, counsel elaborated that Holmer's testimony was not relevant 
because Defendant called the DEA several months after the charged crimes 
occurred. R415; see also R412-R413. Continuing outside the presence of the 
jury, the prosecutor elicited Holmer's proffer that Defendant said he 
contacted the DEA because "[h]e was seeking consideration with pending 
charges [at the state level] by cooperating with law enforcement on other 
cases." R415-R416. Defendant believed that Holmer "could supercede the 
authority of the state and compel them to help him out with his charges." 
R416. Defendant thus asked Holmer to contact the Utah County prosecutor, 
Craig Johnson, and ask about a "stay" or "reduction in his charges." Id. In 
exchange, Defendant said "he had access to a high level Mexican heroin 
trafficker that operated out of Salt Lake City." R417. Defendant said the 
heroin trafficker dealt in 11 [p ]ound level quantities," which in Holmer' s 
experience was II a fairly good sized trafficker." Id. 
After hearing Holmer' s proffer, the trial court overruled defense 
counsel's relevance objection: "the basis of the conversation and the 
projection as it relates to the usefulness of the information that could be 
provided and that it related specifically to this pending, these pending 
charges because there's a reference directly to Mr. Craig Johnson as Deputy 
Utah County Attorney and I will find by virtue of that and the admissions 
-8-
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involved that it is relevant." R418. The trial court further noted that 
Defendant's statement was "sort of an admission against interest. I would 
make the further observation that there's been testimony already that some 
of the drugs involved were heroin; and secondarily, the independent 
contact by the defendant with a federal agent was initiated by him and that 
secondarily that it would be admissions against interest." Id. 
3. The trial court excludes evidence of Defendant's similar 
offer in another case on prejudice grounds. 
When Agent Holmer resumed testifying in front of the jury he 
reiterated his earlier proffer to the trial court-i.e., that Defendant contacted 
him and offered to help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker 
"in exchange for consideration with his pending charges in Utah County." 
R419. Holmer additionally testified that Defendant "identified Mr. Johnson 
as the prosecutor over his cases," and that they discussed "what services" 
Defendant "could provide." Id. Concerned that Holmer had referenced 
Defendant's "other pending cases," the trial court called another bench 
conference. Id. 
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court observed that 
referring to "multiple charges" could be "potentially approaching 
prejudicial if he (Agent Holmer) goes into each of the cases and the number 
of charges and the nature of the charges and everything else." Id. The trial 
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court thus asked the prosecutor to "advise" Holmer "that beyond what he 
has testified to or he heard from him that he can't open the door to all the 
other cases that are pending and everything else that way." R420. 
Following the bench conference, the prosecutor elicited more detail 
about Defendant's offer to the DEA, including that Defendant said the high-
level-heroin trafficker "was capable of dealing in pounds of heroin, which, 
for the record, was worth [Agent Holmer's] time" because the street value 
of that amount of heroin was between $10,000 and $20,000. R423. The 
prosecutor also elicited that when working with a potential confidential 
informant, Holmer "[h·ied] to find out if they are currently or have 
previously worked with anyone else in law enforcement." R424. This 
statement prompted defense counsel to request a bench conference. R424-
R425. 
At the bench, the trial court reiterated that Agent Holmer could not 
"talk about [Defendant's] past at all[.] He can talk about this case but he 
can't talk about the fact that he's served as a confidential informant in the 
past in any form or fashion. That's out totally, in my estimation." R425. 
After the prosecutor said he had planned to call another DEA agent to 
testify about Defendant's similar offer in another case, the trial court 
-10-
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excused the jury so that it could make a determination as to the "breadth of 
the direct examination" of Holmer. R425-R426; see also R428. 
After the jury was excused, defense counsel argued that Agent 
Holmer's testimony "could easily lead to mistrial," where Holmer had 
already testified about Defendant's "other cases," and about Defendant's 
"working with other state agents that won't be involved in this case, ... and 
other matters that happened well after November 7, 2013." R427. The 
prosecutor responded that evidence Defendant had previously worl.<ed with 
another agent was admissible and he should thus be allowed to explore it. 
See R427-R429. Defense counsel objected that evidence of Defendant's 
"other cases," and that Defendant worked "with other officers ... that don't 
pertain necessarily to this case," was "prejudicial." R429. 
The trial court reiterated that evidence Defendant contacted and 
made an offer to Agent Holmer was admissible. R430. But the trial court 
excluded evidence that Defendant contacted another DEA agent in another 
case: "[W]e have to be very cautionary in my estimation as it relates to the 
next case." R430; see also R431. The trial court observed that the prosecutor 
"probably [had] enough before the jury already relative to that independent 
contact by this defendant relative to the resolution of this case with a 
designation that he is able to supply them with high level h·affickers." R430. 
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Given the trial court's observation, the prosecutor agreed to "wrap it up," 
and to not call the other DEA agent. R431. When Agent Holmer resumed 
testifying, the prosecutor elicited only that Holmer ultimately told 
Defendant he was not willing to work with him. R432. 
4. The information is amended to substitute a sports facility 
for a ballet school as the facility that triggered the drug-
free-zone penalty enhancement. 
The morning of trial, the prosecutor moved to amend the 
information-Le., to substitute "Ultimate Sports USA Baseball and Softball 
Training" for a ballet school previously identified as the facility that 
triggered a drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. See R169-172; see also 
R808-813 (attached in Addendum D). The prosecutor planned to call the 
"case officer to testify about the Ultimate Sports training facility, since he 
had measured its distance from the defendant's arrest, but the defense 
attorney objected, arguing that the officer's testimony lacked foundation." 
R810. Accordingly, the h·ial court ruled that the prosecutor could file the 
amended information only if he "called the owner or opera tor of the 
Ultimate Sports training facility to establish the foundation for the new 
drug-free zone." Id. 
-12-
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During h·ial, the prosecutor elicited uncontroverted testimony from 
Detective Purvis that the sports facility was within 400-420 feet from where 
Defendant was arrested. R455. 
The prosecutor also "located one of the owners of one of the 
businesses located [within] the Ultimate Sports training facility ... and she 
agreed to appear at trial later that day." R810. Defense counsel II did some 
Google research on the training facility briefly that morning." R810-R811. 
Both the prosecutor and counsel interviewed the owner II during a break in 
the trial proceedings" that same morning. R811. On direct examination, the 
prosecutor elicited the owner's testimony that during the peak months of 
November through May, there were roughly 200 to 300 people under age 
eighteen at the facility on a weekly basis. R394. On cross examination, trial 
counsel elicited that the owner's business required a membership to 
participate, that a security code was required to access the building if no one 
else was there, and that participating clients had to sign a waiver. R399-
R402. 
5. Defense theory: Defendant did not possess the drugs in 
the briefcase, but even if he did, they were intended for 
personal use, not distribution. 
In closing argument, defense counsel argued, among other things, 
that the State had not proven that Defendant possessed the drugs in the 
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briefcase where (1) Defendant was driving someone else's car; (2) the 
briefcase was found in the trunk after Defendant was taken from the scene; 
(3) Defendant never admitted the briefcase was his; and, (4) although 
Defendant had property inside the briefcase, it also contained other peoples' 
property. R572-R574. Defense counsel further argued that even if 
Def end ant did possess the drugs in the briefcase, they were packaged in 
individual user amounts, which was more consistent with personal use than 
with distribution. R574-R575. Turning to the drug-free-zone evidence, 
defense counsel argued that the Ultimate Sports building was not 
necessarily open to the public. R576-R578. Rather, it was more akin to a 
private gym that required a membership for admission. Id. 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the Ultimate Sports facility 
hosted from fifty to two hundred children per week from November 
through May; moreover, the mere fact that it could not be accessed after 
hours without a membership did not mean it was not a sports facility. 
R584-585. As for the drug charges, the prosecutor pointed out that other 
than the two prescription bottles bearing Defendant's name found inside 
the briefcase, none of the other drugs in the briefcase had peoples' names on 
them. R591. Additionally, Defendant never told the officers the names of 
the alleged friends from whom he obtained either the stolen trailer or the 
-14-
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Cadillac. R591-592. Defendant had been the Cadillac's sole occupant and 
driver. Id. Added to that, the briefcase in the trunk contained myriad pills 
and other illicit drugs packaged for distribution, scales for weighing drugs, 
and additional baggies. R592. Although the briefcase also contained 
paraphernalia that could be used to ingest or inhale some of the drugs, that 
did not mean the multitude of drugs in the briefcase were intended only for 
Defendant's personal use. Id. To the contrary, the drugs were packaged for 
distribution: "[I]t's a mobile pharmacy. But he's not a pharmacist, ladies 
and gentleman, he's a drug dealer." R593. Finally, the prosecutor argued 
that Agent Holmer' s testimony about Defendant's offer to help the DEA 
gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced charges 
in this case showed Defendant's "consciousness of guilt" for the charged 
crimes. Td. 
The jury convicted Defendant as charged. R178-R188. The trial court 
imposed statu~ory prison terms of five-years-to-life for each of the six first 
degree felony convictions; one-to-fifteen year prison terms for each of the 
three second degree felony convictions; and a zero-to-five year term for the 
third degree felony conviction. R236-R239. The trial court ordered that the 
prison terms run concurrent with each other and with Defendant's 
sentences in other cases. R238;R732. The h 4 ial court sentenced Defendant to 
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257 days jail with credit for time served for the class A misdemeanor. R238. 
The court also "suspended all fines and fees," and recommended that 
Defendant participate in the Conquest Program in prison, and that he 
"serve the least amount of time possible after getting his treatment in terms 
of drug rehab." R732-33. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R240. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I.(a). Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
overruling an alleged rule 403 objection to evidence that he offered to help 
the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for 
leniency. But Defendant did not preserve a rule 403 objection to this 
evidence; he raised only a relevance objection. The trial court overruled 
Defendant's relevance objection and Defendant has abandoned that claim 
on appeal. Because Defendant's argument regarding an alleged rule 403 
objection is unpreserved, this Court will address it only if Defendant can 
establish plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, or exceptional 
circumstances. 
I.(b). Defendant alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective 
for not raising a rule 403 objection to the offer evidence. But Defendant has 
not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel reasonably chose to 
forgo a rule 403 objection because he reasonably concluded that rule 403 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would not have excluded it. That rule creates a high bar to excluding 
relevant evidence. It applies only when the evidence's probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. 
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that evidence of 
Defendant's offer to help the DEA had high probative value because it went 
to the central issue of the case- i.e., whether Defendant knowingly 
possessed the drugs in the briefcase, and if so, whether he intended to 
distribute them. Counsel argued that the drugs in the briefcase did not 
belong to Defendant, but that even if they did, he did not intend to 
distribute them. Defendant's offer to help the DEA get access to a high-
level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced charges was therefore highly 
relevant and probative of Defendant's knowledge and intent. 
Counsel also could have reasonably concluded that the h·ial court 
would view Defendant's offer to help the DEA as highly probative because 
the offer arguably constituted a tacit admission of Defendant's guilt. 
Defendant's request for leniency arguably showed that he believed that the 
drug charges against him were valid. The evidence also had a low potential 
for unfair prejudice because Defendant's offer to help the DEA was tied to 
his request for leniency in this case, therefore reducing the chance that the 
jury would consider the testimony only as evidence that Defendant knew 
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drug dealers. Given all this, counsel could have reasonably decided that a 
rule 403 objection would be futile. 
Finally, Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection 
would have in fact been futile and the remaining evidence against him was 
overwhelming. Defendant was found in sole custody of a briefcase that 
contained multiple, distributable amounts of drugs, including heroin and 
two prescriptions for Oxycodone in Defendant's name. While the briefcase 
also contained several other people's identifications, none of those people's 
names were on any of the drugs in the briefcase. 
II. Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he 
did not object to a last-minute amendment to the information that 
substituted a sports facility for a ballet school as the entity that triggered the 
drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. Given the timing of the amendment, 
Defendant argues that his counsel could not measure the distance between 
the sports facility and the location of Defendant's arrest, and also could not 
otherwise investigate the sports facility. These claims fail at the outset 
because they are unsupported in the record. The unconh·overted evidence 
established that the sports facility was well within the statutorily required 
distance fro1n where Defendant was arrested in possession of the drugs. It 
is further uncontroverted that trial counsel researched the sports facility 
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online that morning, and that he also interviewed an owner before she 
testified. No record evidence proves- or even suggests - that any 
additional research could have established that the sports facility was more 
than 1000 feet from the location of Defendant's arrest, or that it did not 
otherwise qualify to trigger the drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. 
Moreover, Defendant has not sought a remand to develop any non-
speculative evidence supporting his claim of ineffectiveness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING AN 
ALLEGED RULE 403 OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT OFFERED TO HELP THE DEA GAIN 
ACCESS TO A HIGH-LEVEL HEROIN TRAFFICKER IN 
EXCHANGE FOR LENIENCY; ALTERNATIVELY, 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS COUNSEL 
WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT OBJECT 
UNDER RULE 403 
In Point I of his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred 
when it overruled an alleged rule 403 objection to Agent Holmer's 
testimony that Defendant offered to help the DEA gain access to a high-
level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced charges. Aplt.Br.9-15 (citing 
Utah R. Evid. 403). Alternatively, Defendant argues that his counsel was 
ineffective for not raising a rule 403 objection to the testimony. Aplt.Br.16-
18. Defendant's challenge fails first because he never raised a rule 403 
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objection to the evidence; rather, Defendant challenged Holmer' s offer 
testimony on relevance grounds only, a claim he has now abandoned on 
appeal. See Aplt.Br.9-18. Defendant's alternative argument, that his counsel 
was ineffective because he did not raise a rule 403 objection to the offer 
testimony, fails because Defendant has not proven-and cannot prove-
deficient performance or prejudice. 
A. Defendant did not preserve a rule 403 objection to the offer 
testimony. 
"To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be preserved to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on 
that issue." State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ,121, 352 P.3d 107 (citation and 
quotation omitted). An objection on one ground "does not preserve for 
appeal any alternative grounds for objection." Id. (citation and quotation 
omitted). 
Defendant argues that the h·ial court erred in overruling an alleged 
prejudice objection to Agent Hohner's testimony that Defendant offered to 
help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in Salt Lake City 
in exchange for reduced charges. Aplt.Br.9-16. Defendant's argument fails 
at the outset, however, because he did not preserve a rule 403 objection 
below; rather, as shown in the Statement of the Case, above, Defendant's 
only objection to this testimony was that it was irrelevant. See R414,R417-
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418. Instead of reasserting his relevance objection on appeal, Defendant 
now asserts a rule 403 prejudice objection. Aplt.Br.9-15. But to the extent 
that counsel raised a prejudice objection below, it went solely to Holmer' s 
testimony that obliquely referenced Defendant's other cases, not Holmer' s 
testimony about Defendant's offer to help the DEA in this case. Compare 
R427-429 and R414,R418. Because an objection on one ground II does not 
preserve for appeal any alternative grounds for objection," Defendant's rule 
403 objection is unpreserved. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ,r21 (citation and 
quotation omitted). This Court will thus review Defendant's rule 403 
challenge to Holmer' s offer testimony II only if Defendant can establish plain 
error, ineffective assistance of counsel, or exceptional circumstances." State 
v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, if34, 276 P.3d 1207. 
Implicitly recognizing as n1uch, Defendant alternatively argues that 
his counsel was ineffective for not raising a rule 403 objection to Holmer' s 
offer testimony. See Aplt.Br.16-18. 
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B. Defendant cannot rebut the strong presumption that his 
counsel reasonably decided to forgo a rule 403 objection to 
the offer evidence; nor has he shown prejudice. 4 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel should have objected under 
rule 403 to Agent Holmer' s testimony that he offered to help the DEA gain 
access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for leniency. 
Aplt.Br.10,16-18. Defendant argues that the testimony was excludable 
under rule 403 because there was "no evidence that the drug trafficker was 
involved in the charged crime" - thus, Defendant argues, the evidence was 
unfairly prejudicial. Aplt.Br.17. He further argues that Holmer's testimony 
about Defendant's offer constituted Strickland prejudice because it appealed 
"to the jury's passions or prejudices," and associated Defendant "with a 
feared . . . group." Aplt.Br.17-18 (quotation and citation omitted). 
Defendant is mistaken on both counts. 
To prevail on his ineffectiveness claim, Defendant "has the difficult 
burden of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice." 
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in original). A 
failure to prove either element defeats an ineffectiveness claim. Strickland v. 
4 Defendant raises a similar claim of ineffectiveness in a related case, 
State v. Edgar, Case No. 20150594-CA. The State's Brief of Appellee in that 
case was filed on 20 April 2016. 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697 (1984); accord State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
119 (Utah 1989). Defendant has not proven either Strickland element. 
1. Defendant cannot rebut the slTong presumption that 
counsel reasonably decided to forgo a rule 403 objection 
because the offer testimony had slTong probative value 
and posed little danger of unfair prejudice. 
This Court's review of counsel's performance begins with a "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 
1997) ( quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The presumption exists because 
of the II variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel" and II the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." 
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The presumption 
recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted 
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
Defendant can rebut this strong presumption only "by persuading the 
court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted). The State is not required to articulate a reasonable 
explanation for counsel's acts or omissions. Nor does a defendant succeed 
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merely because this Court cannot conceive of a tactical explanation for 
counsel's performance. Rather, '"the defendant"' always bears the burden 
to '" overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."' Benevenuto v. 
State, 2007 UT 53, if19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see 
also State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,I46, 154 P.3d 788. But when it is possible to 
conceive of a reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions, then a 
defendant clearly has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel 
performed reasonably. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I7; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT 
App 426, if 58, 61 P.3d 291. 
Reasonably concluding that an objection will be futile is a conceivable 
tactical basis for not raising that objection. Futile objections do not affect the 
evidence before the jury. They do, however, have the potential to annoy or 
even alienate the jury. Such objections can also annoy and alienate the trial 
court and the prosecutor, with whom counsel may have to interact in the 
future. Thus, failure "to raise futile objections or motions does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 
152, ,ISO, 354 P.3d 775. 
Defendant's counsel could have reasonably concluded that it would 
have been futile to object to evidence of Defendant's offer under rule 403. 
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That rule presumes that evidence is admissible and imposes a high hurdle 
for excluding evidence. Relevant evidence may be excluded under the rule 
only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... 
unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403 ( emphasis added); see also State v. Burke, 
2011 UT App 168, ,r 34, 256 P.3d 1102. The rule "imposes ... the heavy 
burden not only to show that the risk of unfair prejudice is greater than the 
probative value, but that it 'substantially outweigh[s]' the probative value." 
State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, iJ29, 345 P.3d 1195 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403) 
(alteration in original). "Given this bar, [courts] 'indulge a presumption in 
favor of admissibility."' State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if32, 328 P,3d 841 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993)). Indeed, rule 403 
"'is an "inclusionary" rule."' State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, if 26, 112 
P.3d 1252 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366,269 (Utah App. 1996)). 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it "has an 'undue tendency 
to suggest decision upon an improper basis."' Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 32 
(quoting State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ~22, 275 P.3d 1050). Evidence "is 
not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is detrimental to a party's case." 
Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ,I26 (quoting United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 
1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
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Counsel could have reasonably concluded that Agent Holmer' s 
testi1nony about Defendant's offer to help the DEA had high probative 
value for two reasons. First, it was directly relevant to the disputed issues 
of whether Defendant knowingly possessed the drugs in the briefcase, and, 
if so, whether he intended to distribute them. Second, counsel could have 
reasonably concluded that the testimony arguably showed that Defendant 
had tacitly admitted his guilt. Holmer testified that Defendant offered to 
introduce him to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced 
charges, and asked him to contact the Utah County prosecutor in this case. 
R419. 
This evidence was highly probative of Defendant's knowledge and 
intent with regard to the drugs in the briefcase. Counsel argued to jurors 
that the drugs in the briefcase did not belong to Defendant because (1) 
Defendant was driving someone else's Cadillac; (2) the briefcase was found 
in the trunk after Defendant was taken from the scene; (3) Defendant never 
admitted that the briefcase was his; and, (4) although Defendant had 
property inside the briefcase, it also contained other peoples' property. 
R572-574. Even if jurors believed that Defendant possessed the drugs in the 
briefcase, however, counsel argued that the drugs were packaged in 
individual user amounts, which was more consistent with personal use than 
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with distribution. R574-575. Evidence that Defendant had direct access to a 
high-level heroin trafficker made it highly likely that Defendant knowingly 
possessed the myriad distributable drugs in the briefcase-including 
heroin-and that he intended to distribute the drugs. In other words, 
Defendant's admission that he had access to a heroin wholesaler made it 
highly likely that he was a drug retailer. 
For example, in United States v. Haynes, 372 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 
2004), the defendant's statement that he knew a woman who manufactured 
methamphetamine using a particular method was admissible under federal 
rule 403, even though it showed the defendant associated with drug dealers, 
because the admission was highly probative of a disputed issue. Haynes 
was charged with attempting to manufacture methamphetamine after 
investigators found in his home various chemicals and equipment 
associated with manufacturing meth. Id. at 1166. Haynes claimed that he 
possessed the incriminating items only for making beer, and he introduced 
testimony that some of the incriminating items had non-criminal uses. Id. at 
1166-67. One of the substances found in his home contained a substantial 
amount of phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), and one method for making 
methamphetamine requires P2P. Id. 
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Haynes objected under federal rule 403 when the prosecution offered 
testimony that he told a DEA agent "that he knew a woman who 
manufactured methamphetamine using the P2P method." Id. at 1167. He 
argued that the evidence '"posed a danger that the jury would convict on 
the ground that [he] apparently associated with drug dealers."' Id. 
(alteration in original). The trial court overruled the objection and 
"admitted the statement, saying that although it was prejudicial, it was also 
'highly probative' of Defendant's knowledge." Id. 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1167-1168. It held that the 
state1nent was "relevant to show that Defendant was aware that P2P could 
be used to manufacture methamphetamine" and therefore "shed[] light on 
why Defendant possessed the various items seized frmn his home." Id. at 
1167. Its probative value therefore was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403). 
Likewise, counsel here could have reasonably concluded that 
Defendant's offer to help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin 
trafficker was highly probative of whether Defendant possessed and 
intended to distribute the heroin and myriad other illicit drugs in the 
briefcase. 
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Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that Defendant's offer 
was highly probative because it arguably amounted to a tacit admission of 
his guilt. Defendant arguably admitted that he had engaged in criminal 
behavior when, rather than disputing the allegations against him, he 
attempted to obtain leniency by offering to introduce Agent Holmer to a 
high-level heroin trafficker. 
Additionally, the evidence's context reduced, or arguably eliminated, 
any danger for unfair prejudice. Agent Holmer' s testimony was always tied 
to Defendant's request for reduced charges in this case. See R419. Thus, the 
jury did not hear only that Defendant knew a high-level heroin trafficker. 
Rather, it heard that Defendant was offering to reveal this trafficker in 
exchange for leniency in this case. The jury would have therefore 
understood the testimony to be important because it amounted to an 
implicit admission of guilt, not merely evidence that Defendant knew a 
high-level heroin trafficker. 
Defendant cites several federal cases all holding that evidence that 
shows only guilt by association is inadmissible under rule 403. Aplt.Br.17 
(citing United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 2006)); 
see also Aplt.Br.11-14 (citing, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 
741-742 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th 
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Cir. 1999)). But none of those cases involved a defendant's admission that 
he had access to a trafficker of large a1nounts of drugs, let alone an offer to 
reveal his source in exchange for leniency. As explained, the evidence here 
showed more than just that Defendant "knew a criminal." See Lopez-Medina, 
461 F.3d at 742. Defendant's cases therefore do not establish that counsel 
unreasonably chose not to object under rule 403. 
In short, the challenged evidence was highly probative of Defendant's 
guilt on the drug charges and possessed little, if any, danger of unfair 
prejudice. Defendant therefore has not rebutted the strong presumption 
that his counsel performed effectively by not objecting under rule 403. 
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because rule 403 would 
not have excluded the offer evidence and, even if it would 
have, the remaining evidence was overwhelming. 
To establish prejudice, Defendant must show "'a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt."' State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, if 86, 152 P.3d 
321 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). A reasonable probability is one 
"sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Harrington, 562 U.S. 
at 104 (quotations and citation omitted). Defendant must do more than 
show "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
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proceeding." Id. "Counsel's errors must be 'so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."' Id. 
Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection would 
have in fact been futile. For the reasons explained above, the rule would not 
have excluded evidence of Defendant's offer because its probative value 
was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Because 
the failure "to raise futile objections or motions does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel," Defendant cannot show prejudice. See 
Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 50. 
But even if such a motion would have succeeded, Defendant still 
cannot demonstrate prejudice because the remaining evidence against him 
was overwhelming. There was no real dispute that the drugs belonged to 
anyone other than Defendant, where he was found in sole possession of the 
briefcase filled with drugs, including two prescription bottles of Oxycodone 
that had labels bearing his name. See R435-446. Moreover, Defendant did 
not introduce any evidence to dispute Detective Purvis's testimony that the 
briefcase contained distributable amounts of myriad illicit drugs. See R474; 
see also R455 ("[I]ts a large distributable amount"). In Purvis's twenty-one 
years of experience, this type of packaging was a "common" practice among 
"people distributing medications to other people." R474. Dealers typically 
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use scales like those found in the briefcase to "weigh out the large quantities 
to put in the smaller packages." R386-387. Given these uncontested facts, 
there was no likelihood the jury would have reached a different result 
absent evidence of Defendant's offer to help the DEA gain access to a high-
level heroin trafficker in exchange for leniency. Defendant therefore cannot 
show that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance arising from a 
lack of a rule 403 objection to the evidence. Consequently, he has not shown 
that his counsel was ineffective for not making a rule 403 objection. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS COUNSEL 
· WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE 
AMENDED INFORMATION OR REQUESTING A 
CONTINUANCE 
The morning of trial, the prosecutor moved to amend the information 
to substitute a sports facility as the facility that triggered a drug-free-zone 
penalty enhancement. See R171; see also R808-813. Defendant argues that his 
counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the amendment. 
Aplt.Br.18-19. Specifically, Defendant argues that the timing of the 
amendment prevented his counsel "from fully developing his defense" -
i.e., counsel (1) "could not measure the distance between the new location 
and the place where [Defendant] was arrested," and (2) he could not 
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"investigate the type of business done at the new location." Aplt.Br.19-21. 
Defendant cursorily concludes that he was therefore prejudiced. Aplt.Br.21. 
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails at the outset because it is 
unsupported in the record. Moreover, Defendant has not sought remand 
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to develop any non-
speculative evidence in support of his ineffectiveness claim. 
This Court presumes that "any argument of ineffectiveness presented 
to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,Il6, 12 P.3d 92. If "the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiency resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Id. at if 17. Defendant thus has the burden to provide evidence 
of his counsel's alleged deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The 
instant record is inadequate to support Defendant's claims of ineffective 
assistance. 
First, at the time of Defendant's 2013 arrest, the drug-free-zone 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(viii)-(ix) (West 2012), authorized 
enhanced penalties for specified crimes committed "in a ... sports facility" 
or "within any area that is within 1,000 feet" of a sports facility. The 
unconh·overted evidence at Defendant's trial established that the sports 
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facility identified in the amended information was well within 1000 feet of 
where Defendant was arrested with the briefcase full of drugs. See R455. 
Absent any record evidence that the sports facility was, in fact, outside this 
1000 foot zone, Defendant has not proven- and cannot prove- that his 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the amendment or requesting a 
continuance. On this record, objectively reasonable counsel could have 
concluded that any objection to the amendment, or request for a 
continuance, would have been futile. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 50. 
Defendant thus fails to prove deficient performance with regard to the 1000-
foot zone. 
For essentially the same reason, Defendant fails to prove prejudice. 
As shown, on this record, an objection would not have excluded the drug-
free-zone evidence because the sports facility was well within the required 
1000-foot zone. See R455. Because the failure "to raise futile objections or 
motions does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel," Defendant 
has not shown-and cannot show-prejudice. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 
152, ,,so. 
Finally, Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting or requesting a continuance to research "the type of business 
done" at the sports facility, is similarly unsupported. Aplt. Br.21. Indeed, 
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the· record reflects that trial counsel in fact researched the sports facility 
online and also interviewed an owner before she testified. See R808-813. 
Defendant makes no attempt to show that these efforts fell outside the 
"wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254; 
see Aplt.Br.18-21. He thus fails to rebut the strong presumption of effective 
assistance. See Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254. 
For essentially the same reason, Defendant fails to establish any 
prejudice. The record does not support that any additional investigation 
would have allowed counsel to successfully challenge the drug-free-zone 
evidence on any basis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on May 18, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
MR1AN DECKER 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Currentness 
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02/27/2015 Utah Bureau of Forensic Services 
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487 
CL Case#: C20131772 
Agency: LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT. 
ORI: 




Crimlnalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS 












ALAN PURVIS ph. (801)769-8600 
ROBYN CLARK ph. (801 )769-8600 
ALEXIS NELSON ph. (801)965-4560 
Suspect EDGAR, MICHAEL JOHN 
Crimes 
NCIC Code Descriotion 
3599 DRUGS/ CO~H.SUB. / PARAPHERNALIA 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT Re: Chain of Custodv 
DOB Sex 
09/16/1980 M 
Page 1 of 2 
The item(s) submitted under the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the -
time any examination, testing, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said examination or handling, if 
any, of the actual items within any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the 
item to assure that any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence 
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the 
examination, analysis, or testing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below. 
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been followed by a reinsertion of the 
item into its original container, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the 
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal. 
Criminalistics Analysis Report and Conclusions 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 








Utah Bureau of Forensic Services 
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487 
C20131772 
LCP ~ LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT. 




Criminalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS 
Page 2 of 2 
Item 2. The orange oval tablet marked "b 974 - - - 30" was physically identified as a preparation of amphetamine. 
Item 3. Alprazolam was identified in the partial yellow tablet. 
Item 4. Methamphetamine was identified in the plastic bag. The total weight of the white crystalline powder was 245 
milligrams+/- 2.milligrams. 
Item 5. The white round tablet marked "223" was physically identified as a preparation of oxycodone. 
Item 6. The yellow round tablet marked "A 111 was physically identified as a preparation of zolpidem. 
Item 7. No controlled substances were identified in the partial orange tablet. 
Item 8. The blue oval tablet marked 1160511 was physically identified as a preparation of alprazolam. 
Item 9. The yellow round tablet marked "M - - - C 13" was physically identified as a preparation of clonazepam. 
Item 1 0. The light green round tablet marked "M - - - 15" was physically identified as a preparation of oxycodone. 
Item 11. The blue round tablet marked "A 215" was physlcally identified as a preparation of oxycodone. 
Item 12. The white oblon~ tablet marked "WATSON 385" was physically identified as a preparation of hydrocodone. 
Item 13. The purple round tablet marked "M - - - 30" was physically identified as a preparation of morphine. 
Item 14. Methamphetami11e was identified in the seven plastic bags and two plastic containers. The total weight of the 
white crystalline powder was 9.572 grams +/- 0.006 grams. 
Weight measurement uncertainty calculated at a coverage probability of 95.45%. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed On: 2/27/2015 
Ryan Barney, M.S. 
Senior Forensic Scientist 
Central Crime Lab 
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03/20/2015 Utah Bureau of Forensic Services 
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487 
CL Case#: C20131772 
Agency: LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT. 
ORI: 




Criminalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS 












ALAN PURVIS ph. (801)769-8600 
ROBYN COOPER ph. (801)769-8600 
ALEXIS NELSON ph. (801)965-4560 
Suspect EDGAR, MIC'-iAEL JOHN 
DOB Sex Race 
09/16/1980 M W 




NCIC Code Descriotion 
3599 DRUGS / CONT.SUB./ PARAPHERNALIA 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY STA TEMENT Re: Chain of Custody 
The item(s) submitted under the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the 
time any examination, testing, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said examination or handling, if 
any, of the actual items within any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the 
item to assure thai any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence 
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the 
examination, analysis, or testing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below. 
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been follo~ved by a reinsertion of the 
item into its original container, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the 
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal. 
Criminalistics Analysis Report and Conclusions 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





Utah Bureau of Forensic Services 
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487 
C20131772 
LCP · LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT. 




Crlminalistic Analysis Report .. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS 
Item 1. 251-NBOMe was identified on the piece of colored paper. The piece of foll was not analyzed. 
Page 2 of 2 
Item 15. Heroin was identified in the prescription bottle. The total weight of the dark brown solid was less than 50 
milligrams. Heroin was identified in the plastic bag. The total weight of the brown powder was 202 milligrams +/- 2 
milligrams. Heroin was identified In the plastic bag. The total weight of the dark brown solid was 294 milligrams +/- 2 
milligrams. 
Weight measurement uncertainty calculated at a coverage probability of 95.45%. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed On: 3/20/2015_ 
' . 2s?_ 
-~C::c· ··. •. 
~.··. ~-:··~; 
. . - .. 
Ryan Barney, M. S. 
Senior Forensic Scientist 
Central Crime Lab 
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11/21/2013 Utah Bureau of Forensic Services 
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487 
CL Case#: C20131772 
Agency: LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT. 
ORI: 
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ALAN PURVIS ph. (801 )769-8600 
ROBYN CLARK ph. (801)769-8600 
MICHELLE HARWARD ph. (801 )965-4621 
Suspect EDGAR, MICHAEL JOHN 
Crimes 
NCIC Code Description 
3599 DRUGS / CONT.SUB./ PARAPHERNALIA 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT Re: Chain of Custody 
DOB Sex 
09/16/1 980 M 
Race 
w 
Page 1 of 2 
The item(s) submitted unr:te·r the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the 
time any examination, te!:>ting, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said examination or handling, if 
any, of the actual items w!thin any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the 
Item to assure that any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence 
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the 
examination, analysis, or tesiing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below . 
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been followed by a reinsertion of the 
item into its original cont2iner, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the 
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal. 
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4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487 
CL Case#: C20131772 . 
Agency: LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT. 
ORI: 




Criminalistic Analysis Report · CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS 
Item 1) 251-NBOMe was ldeniified on the paper. The piece of foil was not ·analyzed. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed On: 11/21/2013 
Mike Saunders, M.S. 
Forensic Scientist II 
Central Crime Lab 
Page 2 of 2 
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 131403330 
Appellate Court Case No. 20150605 
Volume I of II 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant. With Keyword Index 
JURY TRIAL APRIL 9 & 10, 2015 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DA VIS 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
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Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson 
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Johnson 
RANDALL JONES 
Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson 
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart 
ALLEN PURVIS 
Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson 
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart 
CRAIG R. JOHNSON 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
GREGORY V. STEW ART 













Redirect Examination by Mr. Johnson 
Re-Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart 





Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson 
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart 
BRANDON HOLMER 
Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson 
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart 
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Craig Johnson, was the guy handling his case and so that's 
when I called you. 
Q Okay. I didn't seek you out independently? 
No. 





Q And what did he say to you when he got ahold of you 
on the phone? 
MR. STEWART: Judge, just for the record, we would 
object to this on the grounds of relevance to this case. 
THE COURT: I don't know the relevance. We can 
address it outside the presence of the jury if you wish to. 
MR. JOHNSON: I think my proffer at the bench 
should be sufficient for us to continue with the line of 
questioning at this point. 
THE COURT: But let's make a record outside the 
presence of the jury then. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in light of that 
we will take up a legal discussion outside the presence of 
the jury, excuse you at this point in time and caution you 
not to discuss the case with anyone. If you've taken notes, 
don't show those to anyone and don't attempt to learn 
anything about this case outside this courtroom setting. Of 
course avoid any radio, TV, newspaper, comments about the 
trial. With that we'll excuse the jury, then we'll take up 
132 
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these matters outside your presence and once I've ruled then 
we will invite you back in. Thank you. 
{Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: The jury has been excused. There is an 
objection. The basis hasn't been stated on the record and, 
counsel, you may state that basis. You may then respond. 
MR. STEWART: Judge, again, just to make this 
perfectly clear for the record, I object on the basis of 
relevance to this case. This case happened in November of 
2013. 
THE COURT: This contact was July 29, 2015. 
MR. STEWART: '14. 
THE COURT: '14, excuse me, all right. Okay. 
MR. STEWART: Seven or eight months after this. 
THE COURT: Now I don't know the facts involved 
here and you can respond briefly to that and we may need to 
take some testimony so that in fact I can -
MR. JOHNSON: Let's just do that. I'll just ask a 
couple of questions and we'll see where that takes us. 
THE COURT: Okay, very well. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Agent Holmer, why did Mr. Edgar 
indicate that he was contacting you? 
A He was seeking consideration with pending charges 
by cooperating with law enforcement on other cases. 
Q State level or federal level? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 


























A To my knowledge his charges were at state level. 
MR. JOHNSON: And Judge, the Court can take 
judicial notice that this case, among several others were 
pending at the time of this conversation with Agent Holmer 
and the defendant. I was the prosecutor on all of those 
cases. 
THE COURT: So he would cooperate with a federal 
agent as it relates to -
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) What did he want you to do if he 
cooperated? 
A He seemed to believe that I could supercede the 








How did my name get brought up with respect to 
He told me that you were the prosecutor. 
Okay. And that by contacting me, what might 
That he might be given a stay on the current status 
of these charges or a reduction in his charges because of my 
involvement and his cooperation with us. 
THE COURT: And did he promise anything in 
connection with that as it relates to cooperation? 
THE WITNESS: Obviously -
THE COURT: Your tie is running into the mike. 
134 
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THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
THE COURT: It's all right. 
THE WITNESS: So, so whenever someone contacts me 
I'm going to try and determine what their usefulness is to 
the government. So I questioned him about what he would be 
willing to provide, what level of trafficker he could give me 
access to and what actions he could take specifically with 
regard to that activity. 
Q 
A 
(BY MR. JOHNSON) How did he respond to that? 
He indicated that he had access to a high level 
Mexican heroin trafficker that operated out of the Salt Lake 
City area. 
Q Okay, how much, how much quantity-wise of drugs 
could he get access to? 
A Pound level quantities. So significant 
distribution quantities. Anytime there's going to be pound 
loads of heroin, we're obviously interested. That's a fairly 
good sized trafficker. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, based on that I think the 
relevance has been established. 
THE COURT: Anything further, counsel? 
MR. STEWART: Ummm - no, Judge, we'll stand on 
what's been presented (inaudible) the objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll overrule the 
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determination as it relates to the nature of the 
conversations, the basis of the conversation and the 
projection as it relates to the usefulness of the information 
that could be provided and that it related specifically to 
this pending, these pending charges because there's a 
reference directly to Mr. Craig Johnson as Deputy Utah County 
Attorney and I will find by virtue of that and the admissions 
involved that it is relevant. 
So we'll invite the jury back in. 
And it's sort of an admission against interest. I 
would make the further observation that there's been 
testimony already that some of the drugs involved were 
heroin; and secondarily, the independent contact by the 
defendant with a federal agent was initiated by him and that 
secondarily that it would be admissions against interest. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: We are back on the record in the case 
of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case No. 131403330. 
Counsel and clients are present, the jury is now seated and 
that we had some testimony elicited outside the presence of 
the jury. The Court has made a ruling and you may proceed 
counsel. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) You said Mr. Edgar contacted you 
on the duty phone around July 28, 2014? 
136 
i-~~-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 

























A Yes, sir. 
Q And describe that conversation from the beginning. 





Okay, so describe the conversation please. 
So Mr. Edgar identified himself, told me that he 
was seeking to cooperate with law enforcement in regard to 
heroin trafficking or heroin trafficker that was operating 
out of the Salt Lake City area and that he would do so in 
exchange for consideration with his pending charges in Utah 
County. He identified Mr. Johnson as the prosecutor over his 
cases and we had a discussion about what his ability, what he 
could provide, what services he could provide to me 
specifically in the course of investigation. 
THE COURT: Let me have counsel approach just 
quickly and then -
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: He made a generic reference to his 
cases. I don't want any plurality as it relates to this jury 
knowing that there are other pending cases. Now the cases 
could refer to multiple charges in this case certainly but if 
you will instruct him that I've got to narrow that. It's 
potentially approaching prejudicial if he goes into each of 
the cases and the number of charges and the nature of the 
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THE COURT: Okay, what are we doing to do? It's a 
fine balance as it relates to that because I don't want all 
four cases to be before this jury -
MR. JOHNSON: It would be those two, but 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: I know. What do you do? How do you 
protect your client? 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I know. I know. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Okay, yeah, he probably did. Umrnm, if 
you will just advise this witness that beyond what he has 
testified to or he heard from him that he can't open the door 
to all the other cases that are pending and everything else 
that way. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I know. If there's a specificity but 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) irrelevant to this case. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: Approach again if you will, counsel. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: Again, even though the discussion may 
-
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be, may involve other cases or other pending charges and it's 
an admission on his part - I think opening that door before 
this jury as it relates to exclusively here is a real 
problem. So I don't know how to resolve that, you know, I 
wasn't aware of it until two minutes ago. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) he created it. 
THE COURT: I know he created it. What do you do? 
Is it relevant? It is relevant. It's relevant as it relates 
to the fact that he knows contacts and heroin traffickers and 
everybody else and all that -
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I know. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I don't know. Be cautious. 
(End of sidebar) 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Okay, Agent Holmer, so to just 
reorient ourselves where we were, Mr. Edgar talked to you, 
called you to talk about working out some considerations, 
some sort of deal on his Utah County charges, drug charges? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. And as part of that, he was talking about 
what he could offer in exchange for you trying to pull some 
strings perhaps? 
A Yes, sir, that's correct. 
Q Specifically, I guess what - do you use 
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confidential sources as part of your job? 
A Yes, it's a huge part of what we do. 
Q Okay. And so in speaking with Mr. Edgar, I mean, 
what factors play into whether you're going to actually use a 
confidential source? 
A First thing would be what they can actually 
provide, their access and placement to drug traffickers. 
Then there are a number of other factors that we take into 
that which include their ability to be controlled and then 
possibly most important, how truthful and whether or not we 
can trust them which is a delicate matter because anytime 
you're dealing with confidential source, obviously they've 
probably doing something they shouldn't have been doing 
previously. 
Q Okay. And so in talking with Mr. Edgar, 
specifically when you're talking about what he could do for 
you, what was that conversation about? 
A Had to do with specifically access to a heroin 
trafficker who was capable of moving large quantities of 
heroin. 
Q Did you discuss that any further with him about 
what large quantities mean? 
A Well, we had to, as I recall we had to kind of 
break it down because what one person considers a large 
quantity may not necessarily be what I consider a large 
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quantity or something that's worth my time and efforts, just 
quite simply because I get paid by the taxpayers to target 
large trafficking organizations. So, as I recall, we had to 
quantify what large quantities was and I believe it was 
pounds specifically that we discussed, that he was capable of 
dealing in pounds of heroin which, for the record, was worth 
my time. 
Q Okay. Do you happen to know the street value of 
pounds of heroin? 
A I believe it's over $10,000. I think we're paying 
20 for a kilo, something like that, $20,000. I'd have to 
confirm that. 
Q So what else did Mr. Edgar - well, I guess at that 
point were there some baseline rules that you talked to Mr. 
Edgar about working with him? 
A Well, I always try and kind of lay down 
expectations. That's a big part of confidential source 
management is them understanding exactly what we are willing 
to do and not do, what they're allowed to do and not do and 
one thing that I think has some bearing is that we 
established that we do not make promises other than the fact 
that we are going to make recommendations. So I do not 
dictate the terms of their cooperation when they're working 
as a defendant, confidential source, meaning they're giving 
us cooperation in exchange for consideration with charges. 
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We make recommendations to prosecutors and we make 
recommendations to judges but we have no bearing on what they 
decide to do. So generally speaking, those are taken pretty 
seriously. 
Q And you explained that to Mr. Edgar? 
A I explained that almost every time I speak to a 
confidential source whose looking to work with us. 
Q Okay. And was he willing to go along with that 
or ... 
A I believe he understood that. I think I made 
myself very clear. 
Q Did he discuss with you working with any other 
officers on a state level? 
A Yes, he did. And that's another aspect of source 
management, what's important is we, we always try and find 
out if they are currently or have previously worked with 
anyone else in law enforcement. 
MR. STEWART: Judge, can we approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Can't go into any previous or anything 
else that way. There's no - that's improper. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. JOHNSON: Agent Holmer (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: Okay -
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) his conversation 
(inaudible) in connection with his client (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. STEWART: I (inaudible). 
THE COURT: What we've got here is that you've got 
the - he can't talk about his past at all. He can talk about 
this case but he can't talk about the fact that he's served 
as a confidential informant in the past in any form or 
fashion. That's out totally, in my estimation. Okay? So 
that's totally out. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) and because of this case 
and the case (inaudible) he's trying to (inaudible). 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, you can call Agent Palmer as it 
relates to that if he independently goes to him and you can 
call him as it relates to -
MR. JOHNSON: I've decleared him as a witness and 
that's okay with Mr. Stewart (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't -
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: - I don't want, yeah, no you can't do 
that. I don't want a mistrial in this case. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's not a mistrial (inaudible). 
THE COURT: And it's delicate as it relates to that 
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in my estimation. So ... 
MR. STEWART: Well, when he's done I'd like to break 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. STEWART: When he's done I'd like to break for 
a (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Well, we can do it, we can do it right 
now because we've got to make a determination as it relates 
to the breadth of the direct examination from this point 
forward. 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: We'll take another break. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: We'll take another break so that we can 
discuss some legal matters outside the presence of the jury, 
and I will caution you not to discuss the case with anyone. 
If you've taken notes don't show those to anyone. Don't 
attempt to learn anything about the case outside this 
courtroom setting and avoid, of course, any radio, TV, 
newspaper comments about the trial. We'll take matters up 
outside the presence of the jury. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Mr. Holmer, you may be seated. 
The record will reflect that the jury has been 
excused and counsel wish to discuss some further legal 
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matters outside the presence of the jury and first of all in 
connection with that, Mr. Stewart, you may be heard. 
MR. STEWART: Judge, I think we're bordering on 
testimony here that could easily lead to a mistrial. Agent 
Holmer has mentioned other cases, he's mentioned in working 
with other state agents that won't be involved in this case, 
he's talked about matters that happened well after November 
7, 2013 and I think the jurors have almost heard enough that, 
to further implicate Mr. Edgar in other matters. 
second. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEWART: Besides what we -
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, you may be heard. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a 
This testimony is 100 percent bourne out of a 
contact that was initiated by the defendant. The defendant 
took a great risk in doing this, doing it under the nose of 
his attorney at the time who as far as I know had no 
knowledge of this conversation. Anything he says to Agent 
Holmer is an admission by a party opponent and.is admissible. 
It's relevant and frankly, under 403, it's not substantially 
more prejudicial than probative. While it is prejudicial to 
the defendant, it's certainly extremely probative of the 
defendant's knowledge, intent in possessing the controlled 
substances in the briefcase. Where the argument is going to 
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be that, oh, it just was in the car, that he was borrowing 
from someone or whatever and he doesn't own what's in there. 
Certainly conversations to a DEA agent about trying to 
negotiate this case and another case that happened on 
November 21 st also in Lindon, the case officer in that case 
was Detective Palmer, deputy with - actually he was an 
officer with Provo Police Department who was with the Maior 
Crimes Task Force at the time and during that interaction, 
two weeks after this case, the defendant tried to negotiate 
this case and that case with Detective Palmer. When that 
didn't work out, he then tried to negotiate this case with 
Agent Holmer and gave Agent Holmer information about his 
interactions with Detective Palmer. 
At sidebar, when we spoke about this a couple of 
sidebars ago, the Court said that we could go into what 
Detective Palmer's interaction and involvement was with this 
as long as I cautioned Agent Holmer to refer to his other 
cases as pending state drugs charges or pending Utah County 
drug charges or pending Lindon drug charges as opposed to 
saying there were multiple cases and I did instruct Agent 
Holmer about that and I've been trying to keep to that in 
directing my questions and so far I think we've done that. 
So then when we go and talk about Detective Palmer and then 
the objection is raised again, after we just said that was 
allowed, permissible, that's problematic for the State based 
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on the Court's· prior ruling. 
Again, this is information that came to my 
attention because the defendant called Agent Holmer, gave 
Agent Holmer my name, gave Agent Holmer Detective Palmer's 
information and said this is what I can offer you, see what 
you can do with them, contact them and try to work out my 
case. This is nothing me seeking this out from the agent. 
He said as much. Agent never talked to Mr. Edgar before this 
happened, he wasn't seeking to set him up or something. This 
is a mess that was created by the defendant and while it's 
prejudicial and problematic and whatever you want to call it, 
it's still lawful under the rules of evidence and ummm, and 
so for that reason I think we should be allowed to continue 
in this vein of questioning. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stewart, anything further, sir? 
MR. STEWART: The prejudicial nature of the 
testimony, there's other cases, he's working with other 
officers here in state of Utah, that don't pertain 
necessarily to this case and we're looking at the facts for 
November 7, 2013 and what he was doing at that time. I 
think-
THE COURT: Okay. I will allow it as it relates to 
the breadth - now, my understanding would, was when I made 
the initial ruling that Officer Palmer would be a witness. 
Now I'm advised at the next sidebar that he would not be a 
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MR. JOHNSON: His case is -
THE COURT: (inaudible) . 
MR. JOHNSON: - sorry. His case is Monday's case. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. JOHNSON: I noticed Agent Holmer up as a 
witness for this hearing not Detective Palmer. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, then let's draw a line as 
it relates to representations relative to the other case that 
is going to be corning up on Monday and Tuesday in jury trial, 
13 th and 14 th of April and draw the line there. I would have 
drawn that line had I known that officer or Deputy Palmer was 
not-going to be called as a witness in this particular case. 
Now, when he independently calls a federal officer 
as it relates to potential for that officer to be involved in 
this case and admitting that he may be useful in terms of 
drug traffickers, then that is admissible, that's admissible. 
He admits it. He made the contact. He independently did that 
and he was - so I think it's probative and - but we have to 
be very cautionary in my estimation as it relates to the next 
case and you probably have enough before the jury already 
relative to that independent contact by this defendant 
relative to the resolution of this case with a designation 
that he is able to supply them with high level traffickers. 
So let's - so -
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MR. JOHNSON: Okay, based on that ruling I'll wrap 
it up ·and we'll -
THE COURT: Yeah, wrap it up because I -
MR. JOHNSON: - I'll just have to accept that. 
THE COURT: - think we need to use a great deal of 
caution in my estimation, even though that's independently 
done on the part of the defendant probably which would have 
been against any recommendation or approval of his attorney 
at that point in time. Okay. 
Let's get the jury back in here and wrap it up. So 
I've sustained the objection, Mr. Stewart - ~ 
MR. JOHNSON: With respect to Detective Palmer's 
involvement. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I sustained the objection in part 
as it relates to the breadth and as it relates to Deputy 
Palmer. Okay. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. We're back on the 
record in the case of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case 
No. 131403330. Counsel and clients are present, the jury is 
seated and Mr. Johnson, you may continue with your 
examination of Mr. Brandon Holmer. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Agent Holmer, so after the 
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heroin and a potential Mexican drug trafficker, did you 
indicate that you would contact me at his direction? 
Yes. A 
Q How were you suppose to get ahold of him after you 
spoke to me? 
I was provided with a cell phone number. 
By? 




Q And after some time in talking with me did you call 
that number back? 
Yes. 
And who did you speak with? 




Q Okay, and during that conversation did you indicate 
that you would not be working with him? 
A That is correct, I told him I would not be willing 
to work with him. 
Q And is that the last you heard from him? 
A Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, that's all I have. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Cross examination? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STEWART: 
Q So, when you get calls like this do you make 
records of those calls? 
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Depends on the situation. 
Did you in this case? 
No, I did not. 







Q And you keep referring to Mr. Edgars, do you know 
his name? 
A Michael Edgars, Michael John Edgars. 
With an 's' at the end? Q 
A He spoke his name over the phone. I had no reason 






So you didn't get his birth date? 
No. 
Get his address? 
No. 
Okay. And you've always known him as Michael 
Edgars with an 's' at the end? 
A I believe so. 
MR. STEWART: Okay, that's all I have. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you Mr. 
Holmer for being here. 
Any reason why he ought not to be excused? 
MR. JOHNSON: If we could approach? Yeah if we can 
approach real quick. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
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The Order of the Court is stated below: .. ·· ~:~··:' · -~ 
Dated: January 28, 2016 Isl Lynn W.D~yJs}:.>, ; 
03 :22:46 PM Distrid-ro~rf Judge/ 
<:~~~-1_'.:.i_;-f~··' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING THE 
RECORD 
Dist. Ct. No. 131403330 
App. No. 20150605-CA 
Judge Lynn Davis 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on January 12, 2016, on 
request of the Court of Appeals to determine what happened at an unrecorded 
pre-trial bench conference. Craig Johnson appeared on behalf of the State, and 
Emily Adams appeared on behalf of Defendant Michael Edgar. 
Based on the testimony received at the hearing, the Court makes the 
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following findings of fact: 
1. Mr. Edgar was charged by Information with, among other things, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
2. The State amended the Information and charged Mr. Edgar with 
possession with intent to distribute within a drug-free zone. The 
State alleged in the Amended Information that Mr. Edgar committed 
the crime within 1,000 feet of a ballet school. 
3. The ballet school, however, was over 1,000 feet from where Mr. 
Edgar was arrested. 
4. The trial in this case occurred on April 9-10, 2015. 
5. Around 8:30am on April 9, 2015, this Court, the prosecutor, and the 
defense attorney held an in-chambers conference. That conference 
was not recorded, although it was not the intent of the parties for the 
conference to be an on-the-record type of hearing; it was more of a 
conference where the attorneys touched base with the Court about 
the upcoming trial. 
6. The prosecutor brought to that conference a Second Amended 
2 
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Information, where, for the first time, Mr. Edgar was charged with 
committing a crime within 1,000 feet of the "Ultimate Sports USA 
Baseball and Softball Training Facility to the NW, making it a drug-
free zone." 
7. The prosecutor wanted the police case officer to testify about the 
Ultimate Sports training facility, since he had measured its distance 
from the defendant's arrest, but the defense attorney objected, 
arguing that the officer's testimony lacked foundation. The Court 
indicated that it would likely not allow the case officer's testimony 
about the Ultimate Sports training facility, but that the State could 
file the Second Amended Information if that State called the owner 
or operator of the Ultimate Sports training facility to establish the 
foundation for the new drug-free zone. 
8. The prosecutor and case officer then located one of the owners of 
one of the businesses located at the Ultimate Sports training facility 
on the morning of April 9, 2015, and she agreed to appear at trial 
later that day. The defense attorney did some Google research on the 
3 
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training facility briefly that morning. 
9. As aforementioned, the prosecutor did ask permission from this 
Court to file the Second Amended Information. The prosecutor 
based the Second Amended Information on the information from 
the police officer, and had he not had the testimony from the police 
officer, he would not have asked for permission to file the Second 
Amended Information. The Court granted permission to file the 
Second Amended Information as long as the prosecutor could get 
one of the owners to testify and as long as the defense attorney 
could interview the owner during a break at trial. 
10. The prosecutor and the defense attorney interviewed the owner for 
the first and only time during a break in the trial proceedings on the 
morning of April 8, 2015. 
11. The owner did testify at trial and was cross-examined at trial. 
12. As a result, the Court granted the State permission to file the Second 
Amended Information, which the defendant was convicted of, 
including the drug-free zone beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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